Andy Kessler

Charts of Household Debt showing 7 years of overhang

Here is my conclusion, that we are 3 years into a 7 or more year deleveraging of household debt. The blue is actual through the first quarter of 2010. The red is trendline and the transparent blue box is my estimate for household debt to get back to trendline. You can download the data from this St. Louis Fed page.

 

Here is the same chart with data from 1980 instead of all the way back to 1953.

 

The original Fed chart looks like this:

OK, and now to show you there is nothing up my sleeve, here is the chart showing trendline. I used household debt data from the fall of 1983 start of the economic expansion through the spring of 2004, which was when Alan Greenspan declared that there was no deflation, but oddly didn't raise rates fast enough, the seeds of the credit bubble to follow. I used the Excel trenline function, using a simple linear trendline. You can select your own data and get different results, but I think I am pretty close.

WSJ: We Should Have Eaten Those Toxic Assets

TARP and the Continuing Problem of Toxic Assets

It was a bold bet that the Treasury and Fed could engineer an economic recovery without allowing the repricing of U.S. housing stock.

We should have eaten those toxic assets instead of sweeping them under the carpet.

The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was a foolish bait and switch. To prevent the 2008 financial crisis from worsening, TARP was originally designed to buy toxic mortgage derivatives weighing down banks and Wall Street, but no one could decide what price to pay for them. Too high and TARP would look like a government handout. But if the Treasury paid what they were worth, which was not much, financial firms would have to take huge write-offs, forcing many of them into insolvency and even nationalization.

So Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson switched plans, investing TARP funds directly into banks for a piece of equity. The idea was that banks would "earn out" their toxic portfolio—i.e., slowly write them off against the profits gained by the Federal Reserve's zero interest rate policy. It was a bold bet that the Treasury and Fed could engineer an economic recovery without allowing the bottoming action of a sharp but swift repricing of the U.S. housing stock. It turns out they only bought time, not a recovery, and now we are paying for that mistake.

Read the rest of the article here.

Fox Business Interview with Brian Sullivan: Get used to market volatility

Interview with Andrew Warner at mixergy.com

Starts at 1:40. Andrew Warner is a terrific interviewer. Got me talking way too much...

Real world catches up to (Grumby) fiction - Sighting #2

Glenn Reynolds at Instapundit points out these video camera sunglasses. In Grumby, the shades are a lot cooler - Oakleys, naturally - and without the dorky extra plastic. Still, all these zShades30 need are Bluetooth and self generating power and a little code and ...

An excerpt below.

3:31 p.m., April 27, Milpitas

The counter on the plasma TV reads 387,428. Software sales are tracking pretty well to Grumby sales. People are buying at least one application, many two or three. The office is hopping as usual. People are everywhere. I saw someone sitting on the torture chair using a laptop. We’ve got a lot to do.

RecordAll is a hit. Meeta set the price at $20 if you store all your conversations on your own PC. Or for $1 a month, we can store them for you, on Amazon’s servers. We figure that even if someone leaves it on 24 hours a day and records everything, our cost from Amazon for storage and bandwidth won’t come to much more than 10 cents. Not bad.

Meeta walks up to my desk. I have to do a double take. I’ve never seen Oakley sunglasses quite like the ones Meeta is wearing.

“Cool shades, where’d you get them?” I ask.

“This guy,” Meeta says, pointing to a guy in a Hawaiian shirt at his desk.

“Does he work for us?”

“No.”

“Oh.”

“Oakley.”

“I can see.” I say, focusing on my screen.

“He’s from Oakley.”

“Ohhh,” I turn around. “Any more of those?”

“Sure, I’ve got a whole bag. The name’s David.”

I shake his hand, and then eye his bag as he reaches in and pulls out similar sunglasses and hands them to me. They have that classic Oakley tear drop shape and wire rims, but something is different. An expanded frame maybe. More of a tube than a wire. It looks spectacular.

“Awesome. You selling these?” Oakley’s are expensive, I figure these were probably $150 or $200. I don’t think I’ve ever spent that much on sunglasses. I lose them too often.

“No, not yet. That’s why I’m here,” David says.

“Well you can’t have these back.” I put my face in front of my Grumby and then look at the image of myself on my screen. arMirror, Meeta calls it. I’m definitely stylin’.

“We bombed with our Thumper,” David says.

“Excuse me?”

“Our MP3 sunglasses. Right idea, wrong execution. And way too early,” David admits.

He’s talking about those huge Oakley sunglasses with an MP3 player built in and clunky ear pieces.

“I remember seeing those. Too bulky, right? And the earphones were awkward.”

“Guilty.” David pauses. “So we’ve been playing around with carbon fiber and Bluetooth and…”

“Oh, I get it,” I interrupt. “You’re not here to sell us sunglasses are you?”

David looks at Meeta, who just shrugs and then looks back at me.

“No. Well yes, sort of. I’m here to sell you ON sunglasses.”

“Uh-huh?” I’m confused but curious.

“Here, give those back to me for second,” David says as he reached for my face.

I backed up. “No way. Take Meeta’s.”

“OK, sorry, my bad.”

David digs through his bag and pulls out another pair.

“Here, check this out,” he says.

He pops off a small translucent cover on the front of the glasses, which I hadn’t noticed before. It seems part of the design. Inside is a small imager.

“Wow, is that what I think it is?” I ask.

“We pried that out of a Grumby. I was reluctant to do an autopsy, er, maybe biopsy on a Grumby, but Meeta had sent down about a dozen of them and we designed these sunglasses to precisely fit the same imagers you use in your Grumby.”

I looked over and Meeta smiles. I just shake my head.

 “And those tiny holes there are for the microphones?” I ask.

“Precisely.”

 “And speakers.”

“Nope, we weren’t going to make that mistake again. It’s all Bluetooth. We figure someone will have a phone in their pocket and a Bluetooth headset…”

“in-yer-ear,” I mumble.

“We tried those. They’ll work. We want to do sunglasses and even designer prescription glasses and what you guys have is the perfect front end.”

 “So what about power? We can shove tons of lithium ion batteries in our Grumby, you don’t seem to have any room.”

“Great question. We use tiny hearing aid batteries,” David answers.

“Won’t the imagers and Bluetooth kill those in a few minutes?” I ask.

“We think we can get a couple of hours in standby mode and maybe 15 minutes active.”

“Oh, that’s all.”

I must sound disappointed.

“Hold on. We’re experimenting with a motion charger into the tube of the frame.”

“Huh?”

“Try holding your head still for more than a few seconds. It’s always in motion. We put in these tiny magneto-motion sensitive chargers, every time your head moves, it recharges the hearing aid batteries. If you need a good charge, you just shake your head around for a few seconds and you get another couple of minutes of juice.”

“Too cool. I love it. We’re in. We can work out a deal pretty quickly so that…”

David reaches into his back pocket.

“Meeta warned me.”

He hands me a check, made out to Grumby Mogul Limited Company Inc., for $20 million.

“And I understand that’s against $5 per unit and your cut of application software that we sell?” David asks.

 “Perfect. Meanwhile, can you send a hundred of these new ones?”

“Three hundred thirty seven,” Meeta corrects.

“Is that how many people we have?” I ask.

Meeta just nods.

“Well, thanks,” I say to David, fingering the shades on my head.

“No. Thank you, thank you, thank you,” he almost seems to bow as he walks backwards away from my desk. “This is going to be our biggest runner.”

After the Oakley dude left, I say “Meeta?”

“Yes, your lordship.”

I just laugh. “Cable?”

“Tolkien,” Meeta smiles.

“Well, at least he wrote his own stuff. Do we really need all these people?”

“More.” Meeta answers.

“For?”

“The ring.” Meeta quickly states.

“The…?”

“At this point, we’re going for it, are we not?”

“I guess so,” I mumble.

“It is very much too late to guess,” Meeta tells me.

“OK, the ring.”

 “Or else what?” I mumble.

“No else. Just the ring.”

I hear a chorus of, “One ring to rule them all…” from every Grumby in the building.

http://www.amazon.com/Grumby-ebook/dp/098271632X/ref=andykessler-20

 

 

WSJ: The Yo-Yo Market and You

Bull markets, it is said, climb a wall of worry. Smart investors buy in early when worries about profits or inflation or wars scare away the faint of heart. Latecomers then bid up stocks as each worry becomes unfounded, until there is nothing left to worry about. Once there is only good news, the market peaks as there is no one left to buy.

Bear markets, on the other hand, fall into what I like to call the pit of doom. Forget about worries—actual bad stuff happens, until nothing bad is left to happen and the market bottoms as there is no one left to sell. 

From early May through last week, the market dropped 1500 points into the pit, on the backs of gushing BP oil, riots in Europe, a 30% drop in pending home sales and the news that maybe your next door neighbor is a Russian spy. But now we've seen 680 Dow points added over seven straight up days before a slight decline yesterday. What the heck is going on?

Click here for the rest of the article.

Interviews with Andrew Keen and Techcrunch

Here are parts 2-5:

Part Two: Kessler on The World Economy

Part Three: Kessler on Productivity

Part Four: Kessler on The Next Big Thing

Part Five: Kessler on Where To Invest

Real world catches up to (Grumby) fiction - that was fast!

Not a week after getting my book Grumby up for sale on Amazon, Steve Lohr and John Markoff write a front page article for the New York Times with an almost, but not quite, real world example of a Grumby in action.

Eric Horvitz at Microsoft and others are using speech recognition and voice technology to displace medical assistants and receptionists.

Here is the Microsoft medical assistant:

“Hi, thanks for coming,” the medical assistant says, greeting a mother with her 5-year-old son. “Are you here for your child or yourself?”

The boy, the mother replies. He has diarrhea.

“Oh no, sorry to hear that,” she says, looking down at the boy.

The assistant asks the mother about other symptoms, including fever (“slight”) and abdominal pain (“He hasn’t been complaining”).

She turns again to the boy. “Has your tummy been hurting?” Yes, he replies.

After a few more questions, the assistant declares herself “not that concerned at this point.” She schedules an appointment with a doctor in a couple of days. The mother leads her son from the room, holding his hand. But he keeps looking back at the assistant, fascinated, as if reluctant to leave.

Maybe that is because the assistant is the disembodied likeness of a woman’s face on a computer screen — a no-frills avatar. Her words of sympathy are jerky, flat and mechanical. But she has the right stuff — the ability to understand speech, recognize pediatric conditions and reason according to simple rules — to make an initial diagnosis of a childhood ailment and its seriousness. And to win the trust of a little boy.

And here is a very short scene from Grumby:

I’m sitting in a somewhat stark room at Stanford Hospital. Lots of equipment is attached to the wall and on carts in the room. I’m talking to my friend Mark, who has been hounding me for more Grumbys to play with. What a doctor wants with all that technology, I have no idea. Don’t they just bang your knee with a rubber hammer? Mark explains that he got a pile of money from Cisco, the networking company that has had an effort to create doctorless clinics over the last five years with not much traction until Mark suggested a Grumby.

“Hey, it looks just like Meredith Grey…Grey’s Anatomy, right? The TV show?” I ask. It’s a stunning replica, cat like eyes, medium length brownish hair, everything, down to the funny smirk.

“We argued back and forth whether to use her or some old TV doctor, Dr. Kildare or something, but it became clear that no one over about 35 would use this thing, so we went young.”

“Can I try it?” I ask. “Sure. It’s an early model, but ought to work pretty well. Just say hello and introduce yourself.”

I look Meredith Grumby in the eye and say “Hello.”

And in Meredith Grey’s voice, the Grumby says, “Well, it’s about time you show up. We don’t have any information on you. Let’s get going.”

“OK.”

“Good. Now strip down to your skivvies.”

“Um,” I look at Mark, “is this part of the program?”

“I’m a doctor. Grow up.” Meredith scolds me.

“OK. OK.” I strip quickly.

Mark laughs and whispers, “It’s a power thing.”

“Wow, is that a roll of quarters or are you just…OK, I’m kidding. But I do need some personal information.”

She asks, I provide.

“OK, great, beats filling out forms, doesn’t it? Now grab that blood pressure device and wrap it around your upper arm.”

Mark whispers to me, “Grab the stethoscope instead, just for fun.”

I grab a stethoscope attached to a wire coming from the wall and put it up to my heart.

“That’s not the blood pressure monitor. You need to watch a little more TV. It’s that one over there, labeled blood pressure. Jeez, another Einstein,” Meredith berates.

I obey.

“A little high. Looks like we’ll be sucking out some of your blood in a moment. Meanwhile…stick that cone looking thing in your ear, will ya?” she says with a chuckle.

Over the next few minutes, I use the stethescope, a tongue depressor with a little mini-camera attached to it, I get weighed, my height read, all seemingly entered into a database.

“A little overweight there, aren’t you fella? Lay off the cheese doodles or I’ll get you on some unbearable no beer or martinis diet. That won’t be fun.”

“Well, I missed a couple of weeks of basketball and…”

“Yeah, whatever. OK, now bend over, grab your ankles and say yee-ha.”

DB: Greece is Bear Stearns, (fill in the blank) is Goldman Sachs

http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-06-19/andy-kessler-on-greece-germany-and-the-euro-crisis/p/

Even a win in the World Cup soccer tournament won’t save Europe. Nor will the G-20 meeting in Toronto this week. With Grecian urns, Irish eyes, Spanish flies, and Portuguese waterdogs all up to their eyeballs in debt, it’s only a matter of time before the whole venture implodes. Even after an almost trillion dollar bailout across Europe, Moody's Investors Service last week downgraded Greece's debt from A3 to Ba1--junk bonds.

We’ve seen this movie before—in 2008, when it was banks, not countries, reeling out of economic control. Once you recognize this pattern—desperate nations behaving just as the desperate banks did—the next 12 months of news will all make sense. Here is a handy guide.

Greece is clearly Bear Stearns. They’ve taken on too much debt, used derivatives created by Goldman Sachs to put off payment well into the future, and aren’t generating enough tax revenue to pay for their bloated expenses. The cost of Greece’s debt financing is skyrocketing, now 8 percent higher than the benchmark German bund. Either Athens defaults, causing more firebombs to be tossed and even larger riots in the streets, or the European Union arranges a takeover by deep-pocketed Germany.

Germany is the JP Morgan of this story. It will provide a lowball 200 billion Euros to Greece and then end up paying 1000 billion, reminiscent of JP Morgan offering $2 and then paying $10 for Bear Stearns. Now wait a second, I can hear you complain, countries can’t merge like companies.

Of course they can, it happens all the time—though usually when tanks roll. Ask Poland. Or Hungary. In this case, Germany won’t legally own Greece, but in reality, it will absolutely be in charge of fixing Greece’s mess. My sense is the Germans will be quite good at tax collection and not so strong at dismantling the welfare state. But Greek debt will be resolved and maybe the Euro will even rally.

But it won’t be over quite yet. That’s because sadly, Spain is Lehman Brothers. With 22 percent unemployment, and loaded with debt and deteriorating real estate prices, who is going to save it? Tongues will wag that defaulting on debts will teach a lesson to countries that live beyond their means. As a huge exporter, the carcass of a bankrupt Spain will be attractive to some country, probably in the Middle East, given Spain’s multicultural history. This country will be to Spain what Barclays was to Lehman, buying the parts of Spain it wants—say Barcelona—and dumping the wine business on France.

France, by the way, is Morgan Stanley; they have so many of their own problems that they can’t truly be part of any solution. Like Morgan Stanley, France will probably take some money from a large Japanese bank and then ignore them.

Italy, which always seems to drag down the rest of Europe, is, of course, Merill Lynch. It is not really good at anything in particular, though it has retail offices in the form of restaurants and pizzerias across the globe. Still, Italy is a net destroyer, not a creator, of wealth. Not wanting to return to the days when it cost 5,000 Italian lira to pay for a cup of espresso, Italy will (again) fall under the ownership and control of the German state, bringing flair and design to Germanic rigidness. A nice match. The Greeks only have islands.

The Euro, by the way, is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds. Banks around the world owned it because it could never fail. Oops—until it does.

Okay. I can’t believe I’ve gone this far without answering the real burning question: Who is Goldman Sachs? The United Kingdom, of course. Aloof and not really part of all that mess on the continent, the U.K. will probably make money shorting the rest of Europe and then become nervous that Greece and Spain will drag them down as the mess spreads. The U.K. will eventually come around and do what it can to help calm the markets. But it won’t matter. Everyone will still accuse the U.K. of being a giant squid or leech or mosquito, sucking the blood out of Euro-weenies until they cry uncle. Later, when things are more stable, the U.K. will be accused of fraud and benefiting from Europe problems. The U.K. won’t care because its citizens are all paid so well.

I’d like to say that Warren Buffet is Switzerland, but I think I’ve stretched this analogy much too far.

Just be warned. You can bail out Wall Street banks and recapitalize their balance sheets and someday they can start lending again (we’re still waiting). On the other hand, you can’t really bail out a country without massive structural changes, cuts in entitlements, huge reduction in government as a percent of GDP, and a rewriting of the social contract between government and workers. Often, bankruptcy or the threat of it is the only way these nasty tectonic-shifting changes can be pushed through.

Andy Kessler is a hedge fund manager and author, most recently of Grumby. He has written for the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Technology Review, The New York Times and elsewhere and has appeared on CNBC, CNN, Fox, NPR and Dateline NBC. He lives in Northern California with his wife and four sons.

My new book "Grumby" now out for the Kindle (real books in July)

Grumby is a novel, filled with the same funny stories as my previous books, about a guy that creates the next greatest thing, a device that we all will definitely want to own, and winds tales around the rollercoaster of startups and VCs and Wall Street and privacy and rivalries and what it’s like to catch a tiger by the tail and not get bit.

June 2010: Kindle and other digital versions (pretty cool since i finished writing it about 10 days ago)

July 2010: Hardcovers for sale on Amazon

August 2010: Fine bookstores everywhere

Yes, we are doing it backwards from a traditional release schedule, because we can!

WSJ: The iPhone, Net Neutrality and the FCC

AT&T's Picturephone, shown at the 1964 World's Fair, was a huge flop. Apple's new iPhone 4, announced this week, has a front-facing camera for video chats. It might succeed, except that AT&T isn't providing enough bandwidth capacity.

First, the company won't allow two-way video to work over its data network. Second, AT&T just made bandwidth-intensive video expensive by dropping iPhone and iPad's $30 per month unlimited data plans and replacing them with a two-tiered plan of $15 a month for under 200 megabyte usage or $25 for two gigs. Not that I have a problem with AT&T charging me or the 2% of its customers who are heavy data users. I can always sign up with a competitor. Oh, wait. There are none. AT&T has an exclusive contract with Apple.

AT&T can easily build out enough capacity to handle heavy data users. But it may be playing a game of chess with the FCC over its attempt to impose "network neutrality" rules. The FCC (plus Google and friends) wants all users to have free rein to do what they want on the Internet and smart phones. AT&T just wants users to pay for excess bandwidth.

Both are fine and not incompatible goals, except that competition, rather than rules, will best set the right price and make it happen. But without more broadband capacity and much higher speeds, the productivity applications needed to drive the next wave of growth in the economy will be stillborn.

Read the rest here:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703303904575293021509968904.html

WSJ: The Markets Have Good Reasons To Be Nervous

Nathan Rothschild famously quipped, "Buy when there is blood in the streets," but he never said anything about firebombs thrown at Greek riot police, a trillion dollar easing of the money supply, or synthetic collateral debt obligations.

And so, after facing turmoil in the sovereign debt markets, the Dow Jones Industrial Average is down 5.7% this week—and slightly down for the year. The FTSE and the DAX are down, while Greece's Athex Composite index is off 12.8% for the week and a whopping 25.5% so far this year.

Is Europe really a problem for the U.S.? Is this a buy signal—or is it more like the bank run of the last two years morphing into a run on debt-laden countries?

Read the rest here:

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703338004575230012501499240.html

WSJ: Lessons from a Dow Decade

A year ago yesterday, the world almost ended. The stock market was in free fall, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average bottoming out at 6547, down from its Oct. 9, 2007 peak of 14164. Financials were in a death spiral and there was even talk of nationalization. Citigroup hit $1.05, GE traded at $7.41 and golden Goldman Sachs was given away at $73.95. A bear market extraordinaire.

Read the rest here:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704784904575111652626885876.html

WSJ: Bernanke's Exit Strategy

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703699204575017462822204340.html

We can end bank panics forever by limiting the ability of lenders to create money out of thin air.

Last week, voting 70-30, the Senate confirmed Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke for another four year term. So now what will he do?

 Phase one of the recovery is certainly complete. Since September 2008, the Fed has bought mortgage-backed securities and Treasurys, and increased the monetary base to $2 trillion from $850 billion. The flood of dollars has bank profits booming.

Sadly, banks still have all those underwater mortgage-backed securities and derivatives, but Mr. Bernanke is assuming they will just earn their way out of this problem. Banks also are not lending enough to get the job-creation engine rolling again—though sooner or later they will, at which point inflationary pressures will build tremendously. So every currency trader, bond buyer and man on the Street wants to know one thing: "What's the exit strategy, Ben?" Raise interest rates, shrink the money supply and risk cratering the economy, or keep rolling along and risk a collapsing dollar?

My guess? Mr. Bernanke will leave the money out there but restrict banks' ability to create more out of thin air. He'll be called crazy. Crazy like a fox.

The Fed has a once-in-a-millennium opportunity to do away with banking panics. Investors will rejoice, but Wall Street firms are not going to like it one bit.

The Fed has a once-in-a-millennium opportunity to do away with banking panics

Our banking system has changed little since the days of Elizabethan goldsmiths writing more gold receipts (aka banknotes) than they had gold in their vaults. This "fractional reserve banking" system has caused every major panic in this country—I've counted at least 16 of them since 1812.

Whatever the era, the story is always the same. Banks keep small reserves, and then invest in supposedly safe "sure things" to generate profits beyond the interest paid to depositors.

Sure things can be real-estate loans, home equity, credit card and commercial debt. But bankers are terrible investors. There are no sure things.

Thus modern banking is protected by the twin pillars of the Fed and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The Fed, founded in 1913 out of the failure of Knickerbocker Trust when it tried to corner the copper market, finally learned after the banking crisis of 1930 that it is the lender of last resort. And the FDIC was established in 1933 to insure depositors against losses in case the bank is so bad at investing that there is nothing left for the Fed to lend to.

The end of bank runs? Mostly. Panics? Hardly. And Paul Volcker's proposal to restrict proprietary trading won't change a thing. Banks write bad loans at the top and dump them at the bottom.

Here is some recent history. The 1988 Basel accords set minimum bank capital at 8%, meaning banks could leverage their capital at ratio of 12.5 to 1. As long as their investments didn't fall by 8%, they stayed solvent. In 2001, U.S. minimum capital was set at 10%, more or less, but banks were allowed higher leverage if some of their capital was AA or AAA rated mortgage-backed securities. The rationale was that these instruments could never possibly drop more than 5%, let alone 10%. Oops.

Under the 2004 Basel II accords, so-called shadow banks (which don't take deposits) with $5 billion in capital were exempt from these regulations. So institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns regularly used 20 to 1 or even 30 to 1 leverage. This allowed these firms to effectively print money, inflate the housing bubble, and then watch those same AA and AAA mortgage securities fall by 70%-90% in value.

To sum up, the Fed creates a monetary base and the banks can create $10 for every $1 of monetary base. Wall Street firms created $20 for every Fed $1. In other words, the Fed only seeds the market. Beyond crude instruments like interest-rate policy, it has little control over how much actual money supply exists. In good times banks lend too much. And in bad times, such as today, they don't create enough money because they lend too little.

Perhaps the lesson Mr. Bernanke drew from 2008-09 is not that we need more regulation but that financial firms should not be allowed to generate money out of thin air to write soon-to-be-bad loans. To seal his legacy, it is fractional reserve banking that he can rein in. Limit leverage and you take away the hot air from these bubbles.

Free marketers blanch at the idea of more regulation. But banking isn't a normal market. Banks create money when it did not previously exist. We've built a regulatory structure around this sleight-of-hand and each time are astonished that banks still fail. I doubt we will ever get to no leverage, a dollar loan backed by a dollar of capital, but I think Mr. Bernanke could be headed in that direction. One potential target is a 5 to 1 leverage limit—he could increase reserve requirements by 1% per year until it hits 20% by 2020. With credit dear, perhaps banks will do a better job of deciding what is a "sure thing."

You do need lending for an economy to function, but you don't need all that much leverage. Increased reserves may be the best financial reform we can hope for without politicians mucking it up. No need for pay czars and repressive rules.

Even a whiff of lower leverage and increased reserves will create a dollar rally, as inflationary fears—that banks will create too much money when the economy gets going again—subside. Oil at $50? Gold at $700?

If I'm right, banks and Wall Street are going to scream bloody murder at their new shackles. But so what, they've had plenty of time to recapitalize themselves and show record profits and compensation, a gift of Mr. Bernanke's zero-interest-rate policy.

Tighter control of money supply would mean the Fed no longer has to guess if banks are creating too much or too little. Lower leverage would keep bubbles from forming in the first place. Crazy.

WSJ: Put Down That Shovel!

Forget old-fashioned infrastructure. Here are six government projects to foster a lasting economic recovery.

The House has passed a $154 billion jobs bill, and the administration has announced a plan to spend $50 billion of repaid TARP money to "create" jobs—this time its green jobs, "shovel ready" infrastructure projects ($27.5 billion for highway construction and repair) and a tax credit for small businesses.

More infrastructure? Recycling Great Depression-era projects is lame. My advice? Put down that shovel! It's time to try something else.

We're in a knowledge economy now; we use high-tech tools to efficiently and effectively design, make, market and sell. Building roads and bridges willy-nilly won't make us more productive; and without increases in productivity and the associated corporate profits, there can be no sustainable job creation, no increase in standards of living, and no real economic recovery.

Given that real tax cuts are off the table and a new stimulus (even if it isn't called that) is inevitable, the best we can hope for is to use the power of the government to clear a path that private enterprise can't, via one-off projects that end and disband. Stop thinking concrete and massive construction projects. Think small—photons, electrons and proteins. Here are six ideas:

• Climb poles for wireless. Every street light in the country can be fitted with a wireless access point. Lots of companies, including Google, have tried to roll this out. But dealing with thousands of state and local governments to get access to poles and power is a nightmare. A stroke of the pen can create the Local Wireless Corps, with unfettered access to street lamps, telephone poles and utility sheds to create a massive wireless network to deliver Internet access—10 megabit, even 50 megabit speeds—to both homes and next generation mobile phones. AT&T and Verizon will complain about the competition, but so what—they're hardly hiring.

• Dig fiber ditches. Even faster wireless is too slow. If, as the Federal Communications Commission states, broadband is a priority, let's open up the right of way to a Local Fiber Corps to lay fiber-optic strands to every one of the 120 million U.S. residences (even the 10 million empty ones). The goal is gigabit speeds. It's attainable now. New applications like YouTube are bandwidth hogs. It's hard even to imagine the types of applications possible in a 100 meg or gigabit per second speed world. The only one way to find out? Build it. Then sell the fiber along with the wireless lamp posts to the highest bidders. More than one in each town will keep competition alive. And with so much bandwidth, arguments over things like network neutrality will magically disappear.

• Sequence proteins. In 1971, Richard Nixon declared a $100 million campaign to find the cure for cancer. We spend 5,000 times that much every year treating the disease. We may not be able to cure cancer, but we can find it much earlier when treatments are simple.

Scientists today shove cancer samples into mass spectrometers, in order to identify unique proteins for tens of thousands of types of cancer. The goal is that some day we can all be screened for those proteins as early warning signals. With so many college graduates among the unemployed this cycle, 100,000 of them can dust off their knowledge of biology and we could sequence every known cancer type for $50 billion. Medicare would save two to three times that much each year on cancer treatment due to early detection.

• Lighten backpacks. My son's backpack is 20 pounds. And he's only in the fourth grade. My high school son's backpack is even heavier, loaded with textbooks and cans of Red Bull to keep him attentive as his teachers drone on. A Textbook Corps can scan these books, put them on a reader like the Amazon Kindle, link them to high-tech projectors called SmartBoards that are going into many schools. We can instantly change education, not to mention saving many sprained backs.

• Scan medical records. The administration has talked about the time and money this would save, but doctors, hospitals and insurance companies don't want to go through the expense and hassle of digitizing all of our records. Only the feds, threatening to withhold Medicare payments until digitization takes place, could ram this through. Workers would knock on the door of every doctor's office, armed with scanners and Web software.

• Require TOU meters. It's funny how the "I don't work for the electric company" trick to get our kids to turn off lights has morphed into kids shaming parents into "saving the planet." Yet we still pay flat rates, though utilities need to build plants for peak periods, usually summers from 2-5 p.m.

With price signals, households would shift electrical usage to cheaper times. The technology is starting to roll out (with some stimulus money) in the form of Time of Use (TOU) meters replacing those ugly glass bulbs with spinning disks. Coupled with wireless in-house devices that show appliance electrical usage in real time and clever software at utilities, I'd bet peak usage would drop 30% and educate a million workers on the workings of the future smart electric grid. Beats subsidies for caulking windows.

For a $14 trillion economy, each 1% in productivity is $140 billion of additional output. Forget roads and bridges and shovels. It's a virtual infrastructure of ubiquitous bandwidth and digitized information that will require permanent workers and create a sustainable growth economy, a lot faster than shovels.

WSJ: Galleon and the Trouble With Insider Trading

It happened almost every earnings season. Our hedge fund would own a million shares in some company and two weeks before it was to report quarterly earnings, its stock would start dropping. There was no news to explain it. We were in the dark, even though it was my job to know. Inevitably, the company would report a disappointing quarter, missing Wall Street's earnings expectations by a penny or two. Someone knew. A salesman's brother-in-law heard a few deals didn't close. Or maybe an insider was singing.

The recent arrest of Galleon Group hedge fund's Raj Rajaratnam on insider trading charges puts a spotlight on this game. Is trading on industry knowledge widespread? Absolutely. That's how many hedge funds and mutual funds get an edge. Is insider trading also widespread? Only the Securities and Exchange Committee's wire-tappers know for sure.

It's a short walk from running an information network to being an insider.

Stock markets trade on information. Millions of people generate billions of trades every day. Each trade contains a tiny piece of information built into it. ("I think Apple is killing Nokia" or "I think GM is toast.") Eventually we are proved right or wrong, and we make money or we don't. In the long run, the market is always right. On any given day, your guess is as good as mine.

As long there have been markets, there have been those who have tried to get an edge. Whoever could get the first news from a battlefield, of an oil discovery, or figure out that a company's earnings were better than anyone expected could reap almost instant profits. Edward Calahan invented the stock ticker (later improved by Thomas Edison and Alfred Vail) just so J.P. Morgan could sit in midtown and get stock quotes from the New York Stock Exchange faster than anyone else. Everyone else had to wait for the Dow Jones Customers' Afternoon Letter with closing prices.

Now it has come to the point where firms are spending millions and putting wicked fast computer servers next to exchanges so they can have an edge and, through a system of high-speed or "flash" trading, figure out which way individual stocks or the markets are heading before anyone else.

Can individual investors compete? Many just buy the whole market with index funds or ETFs, but these investors end up owning all the clunkers like Ambac and Qwest. Other investors focus on dividends and end up overloading on GM and Citigroup. Edges are hard to come by.

Sadly, there is a long history of those who don't have any particular edge cheating to get one. In 1792, William Duer, who had been assistant secretary of the Treasury under Alexander Hamilton, used inside information on the pricing of government debt as his edge. He used a little too much leverage in his speculation and died in debtor's prison. The Pecora Commission in 1932 revealed that J.P. Morgan and Co. provided inside information to former President Calvin Coolidge and a number of other wealthy types (including apparently the CEOs of GE, AT&T and Standard Oil) allowing them to buy deals on the cheap that would later be marked up to retail investors. In the mid-1980s, Ivan Boesky (who later was convicted of insider trading) stuffed $800,000 in cash into a brief case to pay investment banker Martin Siegel for tips on takeovers before they happened. Let's also not forget lifestyle doyen Martha Stewart, who ran into trouble for a well-timed sale of ImClone shares. She later served time in federal prison for obstruction of justice.

And what about Raj Rajaratnam? I've known Raj for almost 25 years. We were competitors following tech companies and both started hedge funds around the same time in the 1990s. Raj's Galleon sucked the air out of fund raising, pulling in big bucks from many tech company CEOs, making it harder for other funds to raise capital. I was told by a few investors that Galleon promised them a network of information about the goings on in the industry. That was Galleon's edge. And by the way, there is nothing illegal about that.

But word around Silicon Valley was that Galleon had insiders at many tech companies, a so-called "Indian mafia" of assistant treasurers and comptrollers (though Raj is Sri Lankan). Many assumed that's how Galleon beat the market, eventually growing to $7 billion in assets. Galleon also had a floor on 57th Street in New York filled with smart traders. They never owned anything for long. Raj told me once that if he ever had a long-term capital gain, it was because he forgot to sell something.

We can argue whether insider trading should be legal or not, but for now, trading on any material, nonpublic information you possess, or are told in confidence, is illegal. Period. Even with an edge, the market is cruel, and Galleon lost money on AMD shares even when the SEC alleges it had information on a lucrative financing deal. It's a short walk from running an information network to being an insider. I'm hoping Raj is clean, but if he paid for inside information, prosecutors will likely throw the book at him.

Information now travels at the speed of light. The edge to human traders is mostly gone, arbitraged out by fast computers. Near-term blips in stocks will always be driven by those with industry contacts, legal or illegal. The only way to truly beat the market long term is to use your head, think out long-term trends, figure out where productivity and therefore wealth is being created in the economy, and invest alongside it. This might include investing in wireless commerce, gigabit broadband, personalized prescription drugs, oil shale extraction, or electric smar grids that can better allocate power to where it is needed.

Some investors will make money trading daily and a few will get news that gives them an indication of where to invest before everyone else. But the edge of focusing on the next mountain to be climbed, while fast money chews up the foothills directly in front of us, is the surest way to make money over the long run.

Dow Jones vs. the Monetary Base Chart

Updated again: October 30, 2009 (added 2008-2009 chart to 2009 only chart)

This chart ran along with The Bernanke Market piece that ran in the Wall Street Journal back in July. I thought it was worth updating. The market seems to be following the Fed's money creation. I suspect the market will give out well before the Fed stops printing money.

The monetary base data is from this page at the St. Louis Fed. WSBASE is defined as the "Sum of currency in circulation, reserve balances with Federal Reserve Banks, and service-related adjustments to compensate for float."

 

 

Marketplace Radio: Reform won't change Wall Street pay

Marketplace Radio

12:00 minute mark.

WSJ: Bank Pay Controls Aren't the Answer

In his weekly radio address on Saturday, President Barack Obama said that "we cannot allow the thirst for reckless schemes that produce quick profits and fat executive bonuses to override the security of our entire financial system and leave taxpayers on the hook for cleaning up the mess." A day earlier, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner told the New York Times that "you don't want people being paid for taking too much risk."

So now the administration wants to control the pay of employees of banks and Wall Street investment firms.

Kenneth Feinberg, the administration's "pay czar," is being tasked to oversee employee compensation at firms that took bailout money from the government's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The Federal Reserve will require thousands of bank holding companies and state banks to submit their compensation plans for approval.

The administration has it wrong. It wasn't reckless schemes and excessive risk that sunk banks and Wall Street; it was excessive leverage. And thanks to cheap money and twisty regulations, risk was extremely undervalued. Banks owned huge portfolios of real-estate loans and mortgages specifically because they, and regulators, didn't think they were taking much risk at all.

Outlaw pay and pay will only go to those outside the reach of the law

Populist pay limits are squarely aimed at Wall Street, not local banks, yet for the most part Wall Street doesn't take much risk. Highly profitable investment banking and sales and trading are agency businesses, doing work for customers for a fee. Of course bad trades happen, and there are the rare rogue traders like Barings' Nick Leeson, who hid losses and sunk the firm, or Jérôme Kerviel, the young trader who lost $7 billion for the French bank Société Générale. But Wall Street firms are quite good at managing day-to-day trading risk.

The unwritten deal between public Wall Street firms and their shareholders is that employees get half of revenues as compensation. Yes, half. Shareholders, after expenses of phone calls and computers, get the rest, usually around 20%. In other words, Wall Street is a 70% profit-margin business. And Goldman Sachs, with the help of 0% interest rates, continues to knock the cover off the ball.

As competition and electronic trading ate into the agency businesses and profits in the early 2000s, the firms redirected their capital to invest in mortgage-backed securities, pocketing the 2%-3% difference between mortgage rates and their cost of short-term capital. This was the easy trade, the safe trade—not a "thirst for reckless schemes."

Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and others believed the mortgage-backed security was the low-risk investment, and so it couldn't hurt to use leverage—i.e., borrow far more than the capital they had on hand, 20 times or even 30 times as much, to make additional investments in these securities. The firms raised huge sums of money—from other banks, money-market and mutual funds—so they could multiply 2%-3% gains into those large 70% profits and compensation. It wasn't risk but leverage that did in the financial system. Without that leverage, we'd have had an investment-banking profit crisis, not a credit crisis.

Yet if politicians still insist on limiting pay, there are only a few ways to do it:

• Limit risk? Good luck defining it. Great traders know that what looks low risk is often the scariest trade. You can't legislate market smarts.

• Pay Caps? So do you limit executive pay to $250,000? $1 million? $100 million? Who picks, how, and what are the effects? Not all Wall Streeters are equal. If oil trader Andrew Hall can't get paid $100 million after making Citigroup shareholders money, he is going to set up shop across the street and do it himself. Sure, he'll have to scrounge for his own capital, and maybe not borrow as much. But to evade the regulators' pay handcuffs, people will simply not work for a regulated company. Outlaw pay and pay will only go to those outside the reach of the law—whether they move to a hedge fund in Greenwich, Conn., or to an investment banking firm in London.

• Raise the cost of insurance? After overextending themselves with excess leverage while doing supposedly low-risk trades, Wall Street firms and banks got bailed out by a combination of low-cost capital from the Treasury, guaranteed debt by the Fed, and deposit insurance by the FDIC. It is clear in hindsight that Wall Street and banks have been underpaying for the twin pillars of the Fed as lender of last resort and the FDIC to limit bank runs. And so, yes, it is time to find a formula that adequately values that risk and charges Wall Street firms for this bailout insurance. There are market mechanisms today, in the form of derivatives, that price the risk of doing business with specific firms. Transparency is what will let the Fed and the FDIC use the market to protect the market. If done right, the increased costs will eat into the employees 50% take and therefore limit compensation.

But the knee-jerk reaction—to squeeze "greedy Wall Streeters" who nearly sunk the economy—is misguided.

Forbes: Lehman and Meritocracy

 

http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/14/lehman-brothers-goldman-sachs-bankruptcy-anniversary-opinions-contributors-andy-kessler.html

Part of the charm of Wall Street, and what scares most reasonable people away, is that it is as close to a meritocracy as exists on this earth. It's dog eat dog. It's sink or swim. You do a trade and it makes money, then you're a hero (for a moment anyway) and deserve a bonus. You bring in a deal, you get paid. You lasso more clients' assets under your firm's roof, you're a hitter. I once discovered some good news on the stocks I followed before the rest of the Street, and mentioned it to the sales force at a morning meeting and moved markets in New York, Tokyo and London. I had the head of global equities pat my head on the elevator ride up the next morning. Pat my head! I was told he never does that.

The flip side, of course, is what makes Wall Street so dangerous. You lose money for the firm and you're a heel. Do it again and you don't get paid that year. Do it a third time and you're out of a job. Just like that. Gone. I've seen it happen to friends and acquaintances at just about every firm up and down Wall Street. There is no tenure on Wall Street, no job security, no long-term guarantees. Ten- and 20-year careers end in a flash. Happens all the time, and everybody who works in the business knows this.

That's one reason why everyone is paid so well. Think of it as combat pay. But the other reason compensation is many, many multiples of the average wage in this country is that trading stocks, doing IPOs, merging companies, managing money is a very lucrative business. Not everyone can do it. It looks easy, football-field-sized trading rooms jammed with adrenalin-rush maniacs sitting in front of huge LCD screens. It might as well be a call center in Mumbai. But it's hard. Really nasty hard. Wall Street hires in that 99 percentile zone. And then they make your life miserable hoping you'll quit before they break you. Or hoping they break you before you lose money for the firm. It's not WalMart or General Motors or even Pfizer or Intel. It's trial by fire.

You would think that would make the entire workforce afraid to do anything for fear of being tossed out on their can, back into the cruel, cruel averagely paid world. But a meritocracy works in the opposite way. You have wicked smart people trying to prove to each other that they are smarter than everyone else. Unlike acing a chemistry final or even nailing your ACT tests, the score is kept with real money--how much your trading desk makes for the firm--how big a chunk of the bonus pool you command for your do-or-die heroics day in and day out.

Another not-so-secret revealed--it ain't fun, that's what Harry of Hanovers or Ben Benson's are for after 4 p.m. Pour a stiff one and recall sticking the guy at the First Bank of Neenah for a teenie (I'm dating myself talking about 16ths of a dollar) or bagging the OpenTable IPO or whatever the next deal is.

I'm reminded of all this because September 15, is the one-year anniversary of Lehman Brothers heading off to the great trading room in the sky. The debate will rage on for decades whether Paulson and the Treasury or Bernanke and the Federal Reserve should have saved them from failing. There is no good answer. Bear Stearns was bailed out six months earlier. Bank of America with the Merrill Lynch anchor around their neck was bailed out maybe four months later.

But the crude reality is that Lehman Brothers is a classic Wall Street story. Inside and outside, it was a meritocracy. They wanted to one up on Goldman Sachs, generate as good a return on equity and earnings growth so they could win the meritocracy game and get paid in spades. How dare Bear Stearns' CEO make more than ours! Let's lever this sucker up with mortgage-backeds and create a trillion-dollar balance sheet. If not us, who? And by the way, very few people at Lehman really understood how upper management was playing this meritocracy game with the rest of Wall Street with the rank and files' careers.

When that trade went south, and their creditors pulled their short-term financing, (OK, Jamie Dimon at JP Morgan was particularly egregious pulling a $5 billion plug), the ugly side of meritocracy reared its head. You lose money, you're out. Goodbye. It was nice knowing you. Every single person working at Lehman knew this personally, or should have known. That's the giant sword hanging over everyone's head, the stench of fear, that keeps the game going and going. I've got to use my 99 percentile smarts and win. If I don't, I'm toast, so I'll work harder, think harder, and of course play harder with my winnings that everyone else. The outside-meritocracy downside became the inside-meritocracy homicide.

Lehman is gone, sure, but Wall Street and the meritocracy lives on.

WSJ: Why AT&T Killed Google Voice

Earlier this month, Apple rejected an application for the iPhone called Google Voice. The uproar set off a chain of events—Google's CEO Eric Schmidt resigning from Apple's board, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) investigating wireless open access and handset exclusivity—that may finally end the 135-year-old Alexander Graham Bell era. It's about time.

With Google Voice, you have one Google phone number that callers use to reach you, and you pick up whichever phone—office, home or cellular—rings. You can screen calls, listen in before answering, record calls, read transcripts of your voicemails, and do free conference calls. Domestic calls and texting are free, and international calls to Europe are two cents a minute. In other words, a unified voice system, something a real phone company should have offered years ago.

 Apple has an exclusive deal with AT&T in the U.S., stirring up rumors that AT&T was the one behind Apple rejecting Google Voice. How could AT&T not object? AT&T clings to the old business of charging for voice calls in minutes. It takes not much more than 10 kilobits per second of data to handle voice. In a world of megabit per-second connections, that's nothing—hence Google's proposal to offer voice calls for no cost and heap on features galore.

What this episode really uncovers is that AT&T is dying. AT&T is dragging down the rest of us by overcharging us for voice calls and stifling innovation in a mobile data market critical to the U.S. economy.

For the latest quarter, AT&T reported local voice revenue down 12%, long distance down 15%. With customers unplugging home phones and using flat-rate Internet services for long-distance calls (again, voice is just data), AT&T's wireline operating income is down 36%. Even in the wireless segment, which grew 10% overall, per-customer voice revenue is down 7%.

Wireless data service is AT&T's only bright spot, up a whopping 26% per customer. How so? As any parent of teenagers knows, text messages are 20 cents each, or $5,000 per megabyte. After the first month and a $320 bill, we all pony up $10 a month for unlimited texting plans. Same for Internet access. With my iPhone, I pay $30 a month for unlimited data service (actually, one gigabyte per month). Is it worth that? The à la carte price for other not-so-smart phones is $5 per megabyte (one-thousandth of a gigabyte) per month. So we buy monthly plans. Margins in AT&T's Wireless segment are an embarrassingly high 25%.

The trick in any communications and media business is to own a pipe between you and your customers so you can charge what you like. Cellphone companies don't have wired pipes, but by owning spectrum they do have a pipe and pricing power.

Aren't there phone competitors to knock down the price? Hardly. Verizon Wireless, T-Mobile and others all joined AT&T in bidding huge amounts for wireless spectrum in FCC auctions, some $70-plus billion since the mid-1990s. That all gets passed along to you and me in the form of higher fees and friendly oligopolies that don't much compete on price. Google Voice is the new competition.

By the way, Apple also has a pipe—call it a virtual pipe—to customers. Its iTunes music service (now up to one-quarter of all music sales, according to NPD Market Research) works exclusively with iPods and iPhones. The new Palm Pre, another exclusive deal, this time by Verizon Wireless Sprint, tricked iTunes into thinking it was an iPod. Apple quickly changed its software to lock the Pre out, and one would expect Apple locking out any Google phone from using iTunes.

It wouldn't be so bad if we were just overpaying for our mobile plans. Americans are used to that—see mail, milk and medicine. But it's inexcusable that new, feature-rich and productive applications like Google Voice are being held back, just to prop up AT&T while we wait for it to transition away from its legacy of voice communications. How many productive apps beyond Google Voice are waiting in the wings?

So now the FCC and its new Chairman Julius Genachowski are getting involved. Usually this means a set of convoluted rules to make up for past errors in allocating scarce resources that—in the name of "fairness"—end up creating a new mess.

Some might say it is time to rethink our national communications policy. But even that's obsolete. I'd start with a simple idea. There is no such thing as voice or text or music or TV shows or video. They are all just data. We need a national data policy, and here are four suggestions:

• End phone exclusivity. Any device should work on any network. Data flows freely.

• Transition away from "owning" airwaves. As we've seen with license-free bandwidth via Wi-Fi networking, we can share the airwaves without interfering with each other. Let new carriers emerge based on quality of service rather than spectrum owned. Cellphone coverage from huge cell towers will naturally migrate seamlessly into offices and even homes via Wi-Fi networking. No more dropped calls in the bathroom.

• End municipal exclusivity deals for cable companies. TV channels are like voice pipes, part of an era that is about to pass. A little competition for cable will help the transition to paying for shows instead of overpaying for little-watched networks. Competition brings de facto network neutrality and open access (if you don't like one service blocking apps, use another), thus one less set of artificial rules to be gamed.

• Encourage faster and faster data connections to our homes and phones. It should more than double every two years. To homes, five megabits today should be 10 megabits in 2011, 25 megabits in 2013 and 100 megabits in 2017. These data-connection speeds are technically doable today, with obsolete voice and video policy holding it back.

Technology doesn't wait around, so it's all going to happen anyway, but it will take longer under today's rules. A weak economy is not the time to stifle change.

Data is toxic to old communications and media pipes. Instead, data gains value as it hops around in the packets that make up the Internet structure. New services like Twitter don't need to file with the FCC.

And new features for apps like Google Voice are only limited by the imagination. Mother-in-law location alerts? Video messaging? Whatever. The FCC better not treat AT&T and Verizon like Citigroup, GM and the Post Office. Cellphone operators aren't too big to fail. Rather, the telecom sector is too important to be allowed to hold back the rest of us.

Forbes.com - Thankfully, That's Not The Way It Was

http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/20/walter-cronkite-obituary-media-opinions-contributors-mediocrity.html

I've always had a problem with Walter Cronkite. He had this mind-meld grip on the brain of everyone, including me, who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, with his subliminal promotion of mediocrity and complacency that kept an entire generation in the doldrums. And no, I'm not talking about his views on the Vietnam War and LBJ's line "If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle America." That was just noise.

Look, the guy could read the news okay. It's not rocket science. "Uncle Walter" had the anchor seat on the CBS Evening News from 1962 to 1981, back when people actually watched the news on television. How quaint. Seven o'clock, right after the local news. Like clockwork, finish dinner, put on Cronkite. And he was good--heck, he was the master. He taught himself to speak slowly, with a half regal, half Midwestern accent, so he could penetrate American minds, and infect them with his mystical powers of persuasion.

Am I talking about liberal media bias? No. C'mon, stay with me here. Every night, right after the news stories and vignettes on acid rain and student protests and Dan Rather in the jungles of Vietnam and crumbling cities and heroin epidemics and exposés on Watergate and fraud and corruption and burning slums, Walter Cronkite would turn to the camera, and with almost undisguised smugness, tell me, right to my face, "... And that's the way it is."

Liberal schmiberal. That was a cover. He was the voice of the establishment, The Man trying to keep us down. And there's nothing we could do about it because that's the way it is. And I believed him. We all did. A conspiracy by advertisers on his show? Who knows, but it took me a long time to break out of his trance.

The 70s were a smog-filled haze. Upward mobility was a pipedream. Stock markets stagnated and all the moon-walking Space Age dreams of the 60s were shattered with layoffs and plant closings and Rust Belts and urban unrest. You were told to do well in school and maybe you could get an entry level job at a big company and wear a white short-sleeved shirt and work your way up over twenty or so years, so you could buy that little house in the suburbs and squeeze out 2.3 kids and afford a station wagon and … well, that's the way it is.

Someone else has all the money and you don't. That's the way it is.

Unknown forces control your life. That's the way it is.

Governments are corrupt. That's the way it is.

Society is divided into classes, and you're stuck in yours. That's the way it is.

The American Dream is dead. Go back to work, you sorry little cretins.

Fortunately for me, for you, for everybody almost everywhere, Walter Cronkite was wrong. "Most trusted man in America"? No way. That wasn't "the way it is." Not even close.

In fact you couldn't rely on anyone else--no school, no company, no institution, no company, no industry, no media, nobody was going to raise you up. The trick was to destroy each and every one of these existing systems. Blow it all up. Invent the future by destroying the past.

Not blow it up literally. Abbie Hoffman was a bozo. The Black Panthers were terrorists. It wasn't civil unrest that created change. That was a sideshow. It wasn't hippies or free love or exotic drugs (too bad, all that was kinda fun). All these things destroyed lives and never built anything new. Same for every beneficent government program and professor's teaching. Worthless.

Instead, what it took was a few little microchips (Ted Hoff at Intel), and a couple of funky pieces of code (Bill Gates at Microsoft) and a few smart people (Steve Jobs at Apple and Larry Ellison at Oracle and thousands of others), who weren't content working for The Man. Each of them dislodged "the way it is" and got a few people asking "why is it this way?" and declaring "think different" and "eat my dust," and bang, the status quo crumbled. You could create your own future. Power shifted out of the hands of conglomerates like Gulf & Western and Engulf and Devour and away from centralized bureaucrats running faceless government operations. Instead, power ended up in your hands, my hands, all of our hands. To do what we wanted.

Computers escaped air-conditioned rooms and ended up on our desks. Banks gave way to mutual funds. The New York Stock Exchange gave way to Nasdaq. Brokers gave way to Web-based trading and on and on.

So what did we want? To change the world, for the better, increase the size of the pie, bring the rest of the world onto our wealth grid. And not by building huts in Costa Rica but by taking down those obstructing progress, those leeching off the rest of us, holding us back, milking the present for their own benefit rather than standing aside and letting wealth-creating innovation increase everyone's living standard. Those "that's the way it is" types needed to move over. But they didn't move on their own, so we either had to wait for them to die or just destroy them. Seek and Destroy. Music companies. Travel agents. Insurance brokers. And we're not done--the hard work has just started.

It took me a long time, well into my life, to get Cronkite's words out of my head and realize that not only is anything possible (thank you Kevin Garnett), but that I was the one that had to make it happen. There were no gifts, no trailblazers to follow. We all have to invent the future by destroying the past.

Sadly, the old mentality is back. Citibank is too big to fail. That's the way it is. The government needs to bail out the automakers. That's the way it is. Taxes are going up. That's the way it is. Carbon dioxide will boil the oceans so we need to live in cities and walk to work. That's the way it is. Elites like Robert Reich and Paul Krugman and Al Gore will tell you what you'll be paid, how much health care you'll get, how much risk you can take, what kind of car you can drive, how much water you can use to flush your toilet, because … That's The Way It Is. He may have passed away last week, but Walter Cronkite will never die.

WSJ: The Bernanke Market

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124762005061042587.html

I remember once buying the stock of a small company and I couldn't believe my luck. Every time my fund bought more shares the stock would go up. So we bought even more and the stock kept climbing. When we finally built our full position and stopped buying the stock started dropping, ending up at a price below where we started buying it. We were the market.

Just about every policy move to right the U.S. economy after the subprime sinking of the banking system has been a bust. We saved Bear Stearns. We let Lehman Brothers go. We forced Merrill Lynch, Wachovia and Washington Mutual into the hands of others. We took control of Fannie and Freddie and AIG and even own a few car companies, pumping them with high-test transfusions. None of this really helped.

We have a zero interest-rate policy. We guaranteed bank debt. We set up the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to buy toxic mortgage assets off bank balance sheets. But when banks refused to sell at fire sale prices, we just gave them the money instead. Dumb move. So we set up the Public-Private Investment Program to get private investors to buy these same toxic assets with government leverage, and still there are few sellers. Meanwhile, the $1 trillion federal deficit is crowding out private investment and the porky $787 billion stimulus hasn't translated into growth.

At the end of the day, only one thing has worked -- flooding the market with dollars. By buying U.S. Treasuries and mortgages to increase the monetary base by $1 trillion, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke didn't put money directly into the stock market but he didn't have to. With nowhere else to go, except maybe commodities, inflows into the stock market have been on a tear. Stock and bond funds saw net inflows of close to $150 billion since January. The dollars he cranked out didn't go into the hard economy, but instead into tradable assets. In other words, Ben Bernanke has been the market.

The good news is that Mr. Bernanke got the major banks, except for Citigroup, recapitalized and with public money. June retail sales rose 0.6%. Housing starts jumped 17% month to month in May and will likely be flat for June. Second quarter GDP may be slightly up. And he was successful in spreading a "green shoots" psychology throughout the media. But the real question is, now what? Government interventions are only meant to light a fire under the real economy and unleash what John Maynard Keynes called our "animal spirits." But government dollars can't sustain growth.

The dollars he cranked out didn't go into the hard economy, but instead into tradable assets. In other words, Ben Bernanke has been the market.

Like it or not, the stock market is bigger than the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. The stock market anticipates only future profits and prosperity, not government-funded starter fluid. You can only fool it for so long. Unless there are real corporate profits from sustainable economic growth, the stock market is not going to play along. It's the ultimate Enforcer.

In mid-May, Mr. Bernanke's outlook seemed to change. Maybe he didn't approve of the sharp housing rebound -- like we need more houses! Maybe he saw inflation in commodity prices -- oil popping to $72 from $35. Or, more likely, he finally realized that he was the market and took his foot off the money accelerator, as evidenced in the contracting monetary base (see nearby chart). Sure enough, things rolled over -- the market dropped 7.5% from its peak, oil prices dropped almost 17%, and even gold has lost some of its luster. But in July, the Fed started buying again and the market rallied.

Can the U.S. economy stand on its own two feet without Mr. Bernanke's magic dollar dust? Eventually, but apparently not yet. Unemployment stubbornly hit 9.5% in June, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Housing prices are still dropping, albeit at a slower pace, and foreclosures are still rampant.

But I think what really bothers the market is that the structural problems that got us into trouble in the first place still exist. We took the easy way out and, with the help of Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's loose "stress tests," swept banking problems under the carpet. We waved off mark-to-market accounting and juiced bank stock prices to help them recapitalize, but all those toxic mortgage assets on bank balance sheets are still there as anchors on lending. All the pump priming and stock market flows didn't get rid of them.

Hats off to Mr. Bernanke for getting the worst behind us. He'll be pressured politically to keep pumping out dollars, but he should resist the urge. The stock market will ignore his dollars if it doesn't believe they'll turn into real profits. Green jobs and government health-care clerks do not make a productive, sustainable economy. That can only come from innovative companies with access to growth capital. The stock market won't turn bullish until it sees that type of economy.

Again, when it's clear that you are the market you have to stop buying and begin tackling the hard stuff. By not restructuring banks, by not getting bad loans off bank balance sheets, by not standing up to the massive increases in government debt crowding out private capital, the Fed and Treasury are holding back real economic growth.

Technology Review: A Pound of Cure

http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/22852

The federal government is about to spend big on health-care IT. Too bad the medical industry has a vested interest in inefficiency.

Technology is once again being touted as a cure-all, this time for what ails the American health-care industry. The Obama administration's $787 billion stimulus plan includes $19 billion for health-care IT spending that provides incentives for doctors and hospitals to adopt electronic health records. Starting in 2011, stimulus funds will provide additional Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements for health-care providers using such systems.

These federal funding programs assume that the critical hurdle to widespread adoption of electronic medical records is cost. Indeed, hospitals surveyed in a study published last year in the Journal of the American Medical Association reported cost as the major barrier. Yet compared with other businesses, the health-care industry has been unmoved by the logic of lowering costs to increase profits. The truth is that these folks could have digitized the whole industry ages ago. The technology has been around for a long time: Wall Street began phasing out physical stock certificates over 35 years ago. Even the cash-strapped airline industry has gone ticketless, removing huge labor and overhead costs. These industries started using electronic records because they believed it would save money. The health-care industry simply has not followed suit.

The reason lies neither with cost nor with inadequate technology. Rather, the health-care industry's reluctance to digitize its records is rooted in a desire to keep medicine's lucrative business model hidden. Dangling $19 billion in front of a $2.4 trillion industry is not nearly enough to get it to reveal the financial secrets that electronic health records are likely to uncover--and upon which its huge profits depend. In those medical records lie the ugly truth about the business of medicine: sickness is profitable. The greater the number of treatments, procedures, and hospital stays, the larger the profit. There is little incentive for doctors and hospitals to identify or reduce wasteful spending in medicine.

The amount of unnecessary spending is huge. In a project that analyzed 4,000 hospitals, the Dartmouth College Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice estimated that eliminating 30 percent of Medicare spending would not change either access to health care or the quality of the care itself. The Congressional Budget Office then suggested that $700 billion of the approximately $2.3 trillion spent on health care in 2008 was wasted on treatments that did not improve health outcomes. This excessive spending has kept the entire health-care industry growing faster than the population, and faster than inflation, for decades.

While electronic medical records do have sizable up-front costs, they also have the potential to save big, in part by streamlining administrative costs. According to a 2003 article by Dr. Steffie Woolhandler in the New England Journal of Medicine, administration accounts for 31 percent of expenses in the U.S. health-care industry, or more than $500 billion per year. (To put that in perspective, Google has spent well under 10 percent of that on all its R&D.) Richard Hillestad of the Rand Corporation wrote in Health Affairs, in 2005, that health-care information technology could save physicians' offices and hospitals more than $500 billion over 15 years thanks to improvements in safety and efficiency.

Electronic medical records would make it much easier to conduct the studies needed to track down this wasteful spending. According to one estimate, only about 4 percent of U.S. hospitals use comprehensive electronic record systems; most rely on paper records. As a result, analyzing the effectiveness of specific treatments--for example, spinal-fusion surgery versus physical therapy for back pain caused by a herniated disc--is unnecessarily expensive and time consuming. Physicians must compile data for a significant number of patients undergoing each treatment and correlate that information with each patient's outcome.

Using electronic health records, in combination with data mining and search technology, would make this kind of analysis much easier. Patients who fit specific criteria could be identified and tracked automatically, for example. Researchers would be able to analyze larger numbers of patients and a wider variety of treatments. With easy access to this kind of information, wasteful spending could be identified more readily, allowing payers, whether Medicare or private insurers, to stop reimbursing for expensive but unnecessary tests and procedures.

An even bigger threat to the sickness industry's business model is that by allowing automated tracking of patients over time, electronic health records would set the stage for early detection and preventive medicine. Currently, the entire industry is organized around treating sickness, rather than keeping people healthy in the first place. Three-quarters of health-care spending is devoted to chronic care, but the National Cancer Institute and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention allot just 12 percent of their budgets to research on early detection. Moreover, the payment system is structured around reimbursement for treatment rather than prevention.

With widespread use of electronic health records, it would be easier to expand preventive medicine, not only by educating patients about lifestyle changes but also by conducting mass screenings. A recent American Cancer Society study concludes that prevention, early detection, and better treatment decreased cancer death rates between 1990 and 2005 by 19 percent for men and 11 percent for women. I would like to see funding for technologies that could ultimately improve early detection. Studies are now being launched on CT scans that can evaluate a patient's heart in less than one heartbeat. They produce finer resolution than existing technologies and return fewer false positives. These tests cost $1,000 now, but within five years, thanks to expected advances in computing power, we should see a $200 CT scan to detect heart disease before a heart attack.

The ability to detect cancer early enough and cheaply enough for effective treatment would prove much more cost effective than the current approach, which involves spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to extend the life of a cancer patient for a few months--generally, with low quality of life.

As valuable as electronic health records are for streamlining costs, their biggest contribution will lie in moving medicine toward early detection. Let's hope that the adoption of this screening technology is not postponed as long as electronic medical records have been, in a misplaced desire to protect the lucrative status quo. Like all good technology, it's probably going to get off the ground on the grassroots level. Expect your local Walgreens to promote these tests sooner than your doctor does.

Forbes.com - The Inevitability Of Internet Pirates

Pirates are all over the news this year. They were off the coast of Somalia … and now they're in Sweden? In April, a Stockholm court handed down a guilty verdict for "accessory and conspiracy to break copyright law" to the four owners of the Web site Pirate Bay, who now each face up to one year in prison.

Their crime? Setting up a site that allows 22 million users--and that number is growing--to search for and find pointers to (mostly) copyrighted material on the Internet. These so-called torrents are easily downloadable, perfect digital copies of music, TV shows, movies and, as it's known on the Web, pr0n. Outraged at their courts, Swedish citizens got the last laugh when the three-year-old Pirate Party received 7.1% of the vote in the early June European Union elections, guaranteeing it a seat in the European Parliament. Argh.

The funny thing is, Pirate Bay doesn't even host any copyrighted material for download, only directions to find it. If I were Google CEO Eric Schmidt, I'd hold off on that trip to Europe this summer. Because type "The Climb lyrics" into Google and you get pages of links to other Web sites with copyrighted lyrics to this Miley Cyrus song. Type in "Hannah Montana the Movie torrent," and you have a choice of download sites for a copy of the movie, all one click away. That's "accessory and conspiracy," if you ask me.

Fortunately, we in the U.S. rarely pay attention to Swedish laws. Did you know it's illegal in Sweden to repaint a house without a license and the government's permission? But along the lines of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's remark--"Why shouldn't we look to the wisdom of a judge from abroad with at least as much ease as we would read a law review article written by a professor?"--I say bring on the Pirate Party!

Copyright law and its interpretations have been a mess for years. I'm always amused by pay-per-use Xerox machines in libraries bearing a warning label not to copy copyrighted material--as if there was any other reason for the copier to be there. In 1998 Congress was happy to pass an extension to existing regulation, practically written by Disney, that extends artist's copyrights well beyond their deaths. Google has inflamed the anger of book authors, a dangerous group who can type faster than most, by claiming it is allowed to put the complete text of books on its site unless individual authors opt out.

Furious that Internet news sites are using Associated Press content without paying fees, the AP announced tougher enforcement of their copyrights. In an attempt to show how twisted this has become, I (illegally?) copied the following from an AP story I found on Google: "'We can no longer stand by and watch others walk off with our work under misguided legal theories,' said Dean Singleton, the AP's chairman and the chief executive of newspaper publisher MediaNews Group Inc. 'We are mad as hell, and we are not going to take it any more.'"

No matter what laws are passed, copyright infringement is going to happen.

For the most part, Google and others hide behind a simple concept, that they are in the "link serving" business. Ingenious, actually. Others may violate copyrights, their argument goes, but we just serve up links to Web sites that are doing supposedly illegal things, like hosting downloads. Google's implicit claim is that they are not the police of the Internet, which would be quite an expensive task to undertake. And if the Web were strictly regulated, search wouldn't be as lucrative a business. But are they in the same business as Pirate Bay? Will they soon fund the Google Party?

And who are the Web's police? In the end, it's courtrooms in places like Sweden. They're not very efficient; they don't fit the Internet model of scalability. So really, it's no one. Like it or not, the Web is and will remain the Wild West.

Hand out as many guilty verdicts as you like, but folks on the Internet will copy away--because, really, who can stop them? Google won't do it, Internet providers like Comcast and AT&T, who can block a lot of this stuff, can't do it without Network Neutrality proponents squawking, "Interference!"

Even authoritarian regimes fail. (The Great Firewall of China is quite leaky.) Plus, it is so easy to create a Web service to download copyrighted material that, like that arcade game Whac-A-Mole, if you take one culprit down with your mallet another five pop up in the next few nanoseconds. Sad but true, there is not much anyone can do.

If you want to understand how impossible it is to shut this stuff down, here's an example. I've noticed that Pirate Bay's servers go down every once in a while, for as long as a day. A note is put up that they have to travel to reset their servers, which are in an undisclosed location. My bet is Estonia. Or maybe Tuvula.

So make all the legal arguments you want. No matter what court decisions are rendered and no matter what laws are passed, copyright infringement is going to happen. So these folks should stop suing their customers and lobbying for more laws and instead come up with new business models that pirates can't follow them into.

Rock groups Aerosmith and Metallica have had most of their library of songs stolen, so they have incorporated them into the videogame "Guitar Hero." In that format, they sell them again to millions of fans who want to do more than listen. High-definition movies are too big to download (for now), so Blu-ray disc sales continue to grow. The fact that iTunes is tightly linked to iPods legitimized digital music sales. The Amazon Kindle is kick-starting a protectable platform for electronic books. And newspapers and magazines need to create more than just a free display tablet to properly Webify their printed words.

New services--in areas from alerts to social networks to finance to interactive sports-fan participation--need to do things paper versions can't do. These organizations aren't in the railroad/media business anymore; they're in the transportation/communications business. The distinction makes a difference. And in the meantime, expect digital pirates to remain a menace to the old way of doing things.

CNBC: Fast Money - Bull Market or BS?

18:00 minute mark...

WSJ: Was It A Sucker's Rally?

The Dow Jones Industrial Average has bounced an astounding 30% from its March 9 low of 6547. Is this the dawn of a new era? Are we off to the races again?

Only a fool predicts the stock market, so here I go.

I'm not so sure. Only a fool predicts the stock market, so here I go. This sure smells to me like a sucker's rally. That's because there aren't sustainable, fundamental reasons for the market's continued rise. Here are three explanations for the short-term upswing:

1) Armageddon is off the table. It has been clear for some time that the funds available from the federal government's Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) were not going to be enough to shore up bank balance sheets laced with toxic assets.

On Feb. 10, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner rolled out another, much hyped bank rescue plan. It was judged incomplete -- and the market sold off 382 points in disgust.

Citigroup stock flirted with $1 on March 9. Nationalizations seemed inevitable as bears had their day.

Still, the Treasury bought time by announcing on the same day as Mr. Geithner's underwhelming rescue plan that it would conduct "stress tests" of 19 large U.S. banks. It also implied, over time, that no bank would fail the test (which was more a negotiation than an audit). And when White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel clearly stated on April 19 that nationalization was "not the goal" of the administration, it became safe to own financial stocks again.

It doesn't matter if financial institution losses are $2 trillion or the pessimists' $3.6 trillion. "No more failures" is policy. While the U.S. government may end up owning maybe a third of the equity of Citi and Bank of America and a few others, none will be nationalized. And even though future bank profits will be held back by constant write downs of "legacy" assets (we don't call them toxic anymore), the bears have backed off and the market rallied -- Citi is now $4.

2) Zero yields. The Federal Reserve, by driving short-term rates to almost zero, has messed up asset allocation formulas. Money always seeks its highest risk-adjusted return. Thus in normal markets if bond yields rise they become more attractive than risky stocks, so money shifts. And vice versa. Well, have you looked at your bank statement lately?

Savings accounts pay a whopping 0.2% interest rate -- 20 basis points. Even seven-day commercial paper money-market funds are paying under 50 basis points. So money has shifted to stocks, some of it automatically, as bond returns are puny compared to potential stock returns. Meanwhile, both mutual funds and hedge funds that missed the market pop are playing catch-up -- rushing to buy stocks.

3) Bernanke's printing press. On March 18, the Federal Reserve announced it would purchase up to $300 billion of long-term bonds as well as $750 billion of mortgage-backed securities. Of all the Fed's moves, this "quantitative easing" gets money into the economy the fastest -- basically by cranking the handle of the printing press and flooding the market with dollars (in reality, with additional bank credit). Since these dollars are not going into home building, coal-fired electric plants or auto factories, they end up in the stock market.

A rising market means that banks are able to raise much-needed equity from private money funds instead of from the feds. And last Thursday, accompanying this flood of new money, came the reassuring results of the bank stress tests.

The next day Morgan Stanley raised $4 billion by selling stock at $24 in an oversubscribed deal. Wells Fargo also raised $8.6 billion that day by selling stock at $22 a share, up from $8 two months ago. And Bank of America registered 1.25 billion shares to sell this week. Citi is next. It's almost as if someone engineered a stock-market rally to entice private investors to fund the banks rather than taxpayers.

Can you see why I believe this is a sucker's rally?

The stock market still has big hurdles to clear. You can have a jobless recovery, but you can't have a profitless recovery. Consider: Earnings are subpar, Treasury's last auction was a bust because of weak demand, the dollar is suspect, the stimulus is pork, the latest budget projects a $1.84 trillion deficit, the administration is berating investment firms and hedge funds saying "I don't stand with them," California is dead broke, health care may be nationalized, cap and trade will bump electric bills by 30% . . . Shall I go on?

Until these issues are resolved, I don't see the stock market going much higher. I'm not disagreeing with the Fed's policies -- but I won't buy into a rising stock market based on them. I'm bullish when I see productivity driving wealth.

For now, the market appears dependent on a hand cranking out dollars to help fund banks. I'd rather see rising expectations for corporate profits.

Weekly Standard: Putting the Toothpaste Back into the Tube

Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke needs to spell out how he plans to head off hyperinflation.

So how is Fed chairman Ben Bernanke going to get all that toothpaste back into the tube? The Fed has been cranking money out like water over Niagara Falls. The monetary base has increased by a trillion dollars in just the last six months. And he's not done, furiously printing dollars (bank credits, really) and buying Treasuries in an attempt to flood the economy with dollars. When will it end? $3 trillion? $4 trillion? And then what? A functioning economy doesn't need all that cash sloshing around. Is runaway inflation our next crisis?

Let's go back to fundamentals for a second. Money is a placeholder of value--the price of a cold Heineken or the value of work already done, a hole dug, a piece of software written, whatever. When things work just right, prices seek the right level and we get a match between that cold beer and the sweat from working for it.

WSJ: Have We Seen the Last of the Bear Raids?

So is that it? Is the downturn over? After bouncing off of 6500, or more than half its peak value, and with Citigroup briefly breaking $1, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has rallied back more than 1200 points. So, is it safe to go back in the water? Best to figure out what went wrong first -- what I like to call a bear-raid extraordinaire.

The Dow clearly got a boost from Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's new and improved plan, announced on Monday, to rid our banks of those nasty toxic assets. The idea is to form a "Public-Private Investment Fund" to buy up $500 billion to $1 trillion worth of bad assets -- mostly mortgage backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

While it's true that private interests can conceptually help establish the right market price for these assets, the reality is Mr. Geithner's public-private scheme won't work. Why? Because the pricing paradox remains -- private parties won't overpay, yet banks believe these assets are extremely undervalued by the market. As Edward Yingling, president of the American Bankers Association, said recently on CNBC, "You have to go into the securities, examine the securities, examine the cash flow. I've seen it done, and the market is so far below what they're really worth."

NPR: Zombie Banks

NPR Morning Edition February 17, 2009
Click here to play

Zombie Banks Feed Off Bailout Money by Chris Arnold

• “A zombie bank is not quite dead, but it’s certainly not alive and is not doing any good for the economy.”
• “It’s not lending, but it won’t die so that you can restructure it and have a healthy bank again.”
• “I always liken zombie banks to Night of the Living Dead where you get these creatures walking around with their arms out ripping at the flesh of humans and turning them into the living dead as well."
• “Zombie banks eat the fabric of the economy, they’re just awful. This is what happened to the Japanese, they had banks that were overstuffed with non-performing loans so they had a decade-plus of just an awful economy.”
• “I’ve watched every single one of those zombie movies and you can’t cure zombie-ism, everyone knows that. You gotta shoot them, you gotta get rid of them, cut their heads off, put a silver bullet through their hearts, and get some healthy banks."
• “We have a situation where there’s zombies roaming around and government programs so far are an aspirin, when instead you’ve got to chop its head off to get the economy growing again.”

Of course, that's not quite right:
Spokesman: "The body should be disposed of at once - preferably, by cremation.
Reporter: "Well, how long after death, then, does the body become reactivated?"
Spokesman: "It's only a matter of minutes."
Reporter: "Minutes? Well, that doesn't give people time to make any arrangements."
Spokesman: "Oh, you're right, it doesn't give 'em time to make funeral arrangements. The bodies must be carried to the street, and...and...and burned. Ah, they must be burned immediately! Soak them with gasoline and burn them! The bereaved will have to forgo the dubious comforts that a funeral service will give. Ah, they're just dead flesh - and dangerous!"

WSJ: Why Markets Dissed the Geithner Plan

One of the cool things about being Treasury Secretary is that you get your signature on dollar bills, giving them authority, defending their honor. Timothy Geithner's plan to save the struggling banking system probably does the opposite, throwing good money after bad to a banking system struggling under the weight of its own mistakes. The markets don't like it. The Dow dropped 382 points while bonds rallied as a port in a continuing storm.

Politics will kill a nationalized bank. So spin them out immediately. Send out those shares of each bank to taxpayers. They (will have) paid for the recapitalization

Mr. Geithner announced a three-point plan yesterday to "clean up and strengthen the nation's banks," and made a vague declaration to use "the full resources of the government to help bring down mortgage payments and to help reduce mortgage interest rates." Unfortunately, those are conflicting plans. Hence the markets' skepticism.

The Treasury secretary seems stuck on keeping the banks we have in place. But we don't need zombie banks overstuffed with nonperforming loans -- ask the Japanese.

Forbes.com - Czemu Bernie, czemu?

From the Polish edition of Forbes Magazine, in case you missed it.

 

Forbes.com - Chicago Cubs Economy

The Tribune Company is to announce the buyer of the Chicago Cubs baseball team this week. The short list is Chicago businessman Tom Ricketts, Chicago real estate investor Hersch Klaff and New York private-equity investor Marc Utay, according to a reporter at the Chicago Tribune, who must have, um, pretty good sources. Hope (or is it a goat) springs eternal for Cubs fans, now 100 years since a championship.

The only reason I bring this up is that Mark Cuban, famous hedger of Yahoo! shares after selling his company, owner of the Dallas Mavericks basketball team, frequent finee by NBA commissioner David Stern (another $25,000 last week!) explained a couple of weeks ago on his terrific site blogmaverick.com, why he wasn't a finalist for the Cubs. Inadvertently, or maybe blatantly, he gives the greatest explanation of today's asset values and what has gone wrong with the U.S. economy.

Crazy like a fox, that Cuban. It's just that without financing, the same identical underlying asset is worth much less!

"I never thought it conceivable that it would be hard to spend a billion dollars on a sports team. In this case it was. Add me to the list of people who never want to participate in this type of sales process again. I tried every trick I knew to try to get them to commit to me. ... You name the trial close, I went for it. But I couldn't close them." Like that bigger house down the block you got outbid on.

WSJ: The End of Citi's Financial Supermarket

The great unwind of Citigroup's financial supermarket has begun. In the face of $10 billion in losses in the latest quarter, and with its stock at a 16-year low, Citi struck a deal on Tuesday to effectively sell control of its Smith Barney brokerage unit to Morgan Stanley.

A slimmed down Citi is long overdue. The rationale for a financial supermarket always stuck me as odd. Why would anyone stick all their bank/brokerage/insurance eggs in one basket?

It wasn't the repeal in 1999 of the Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act that killed Citi. It was bad management.

Citibank, founded as City Bank of New York in 1812, has been beat up before. Overextended in mostly bad real-estate loans in the downturn of 1990, losses mounted and the stock got killed, hitting the equivalent of $1 after stock splits. Wall Street was abuzz, debating if the U.S. government had a "too big to fail" doctrine. The bank didn't wait around to find out. It cut its dividend and took a $590 million investment from Saudi Arabia's billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal.

Forbes.com - The Bernard Madoff Morality Tale

From ''Schlub'' to ''Macher'' to ''Goniff.''

Why, Bernie, why?

By all accounts, Bernard Madoff had a successful trading business and was a hitter on Wall Street. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities was one of the top three market makers in Nasdaq stocks, had over 600 brokerage clients and claimed to often contribute 10% of New York Stock Exchange trading volume, usually after the 4 p.m. market close.

So why, inquiring minds want to know, did he perpetrate the largest fraud ever on Wall Street, some $50 billion? He had it made, so why risk it?

Most don't set out to be crooks, but Madoff became one when his talents proved lacking.

Well, for starters, if you leave the Tri-State area, very few people know what a market maker is. At the Palm Beach Country Club or the Boca Rio, the preserved specimens at cocktail parties know about cement or paper plants; their brokers at Merrill (or maybe Goldman) are their only ties to Wall Street.

"And what do you do?"

"I'm the third-largest market maker of …"

"Oh, my drink is empty."

WSJ: Ignore the Stock Market (until February)

Down in the morning, up in the afternoon. Or is it the other way around? The topsy-turvy stock market is tough to read.

In the last year, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has briefly been over 13,000 and below 8,000. The past month has felt like the Cyclone roller coaster on Brooklyn's Coney Island -- lots of ups and downs, the whole rickety thing feeling like it's going to crash at any minute.

Great investors are taught to listen to the market. Each tick of the tape has something to say about expectations for growth, inflation, policy changes and looming recessions. The stock market is like a giant mass of pulsing plasma doing price discovery and a game of hot potato, getting stocks into the correct hands with the right risk profile. It's way too big for any one person to manipulate, let alone touch directly. Instead, millions of us provide input with our buying and selling decisions.

When it's at its most efficient, with buyers and sellers neatly matched up at the right price, it's a pretty good predictor. The Crash of 1929 announced a recession, and the wake-up call unheeded might have caused many of the bad policies leading to the Great Depression. The Crash of 1987? Not so much.

NPR: Navigating Wall Street's Lexicon

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96557570
1:02 mark
"The last fund manager or the last set of individuals out in the marketplace, have they given up hope, have they just said, 'you know what, sell everything,' and just en mass, people are  puking out stocks, that would be capitulation, that is what forms a bottom."

Chris Arnold, NPR: "Nice image."

WSJ: What Paulson Is Trying to Do

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122402984044334627.html
Less than two weeks into it, the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Next week, several hundred billion dollars of credit default swap (default insurance) payments on Lehman's debt default are due. No one quite knows who owes what and if they're good for it. Hence the urgency in Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke's plan to inject $250 billion directly into bank balance sheets, which seems a necessary evil to get capital to the right place and help weaker banks save face. The credit markets agree -- so far.

Wall Street and banks live by short-term loans. But as a loan shark might say, right now, nobody wants to lend to nobody. The rate that banks charge each other, the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), has been trading so high above three-month Treasury-bill rates (on Monday it was 4.75% vs. 0.11%) that no one is lending. This so-called TED spread -- the difference between what banks pay and what the Treasury pays to borrow for three months -- signals the health of credit markets and has rarely been over 1% since the 1987 crash. The Treasury is clearly focused on this metric and needs to get it down to historic spreads. First it has to change the current mentality of "who wants to lend to the next Lehman or Wachovia?"

Forbes.com - New Life

Thank you, sir, may I have another? As the stock market gets spanked,down 40% in a year and a day, there is a silver lining. We Americans get our lumps out the way, and start a new life. Much has been made of the "mark to market" rule and its role in the credit crisis, but it probably has saved us from 10-plus years of gloom and doom.

Mark to market just accelerated the inevitable, the write-down of bad loans.

Google the number 157 and the first result that comes up is the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) statement on fair value measurements. It's way too boring to read, but what it says is that if a bank or investment bank has a security that trades at 62 cents on the dollar, you have to carry it on your books at 62 cents on the dollar. Pretty simple. You may think it's worth more--well, of course you do, or else you would have sold it, dummy--but the market says it's only worth 62 cents, so quit arguing.

New York Magazine: Why Wall Street Will Prevail

Why Wall Street Will Prevail
Things are bad now, but the world will never out-finance us.

http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/51168/

With the stock market tanking and Wall Street’s top firms either vanished or trembling under the skirt of commercial banks, is finance as we know it over? Will the Credit Crisis of 2008 turn New York dominance into submission—to London, Shanghai, Dubai, or even Moscow?

Not a chance. First, globalization has proved itself out. Some schmuck defaults on his 3,000-square-foot exurban dream home, and Fortis Bank in Belgium gets nationalized. It wasn’t just Wall Street buying stupid toxic securities—everyone was. Right now, nearly $200 billion is trying (unsuccessfully) to prop up Russian markets, hundreds of billions of euros are trying to resuscitate European banks. Wanna bet over/under on Chinese financials next year?

Weekly Standard: What is Wall Street these days, anyway?

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/015/654vucfz.asp

Before the last of Wall Street gets sold off as day-old fish on Fulton Street or washed into the East River altogether it’s worth asking, what is Wall Street these days anyway?

Thanks to Dick Grasso and CNBC, most of us think of Wall Street as balding men in ugly solid-colored suits yelling at each other and throwing litter on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. Not even close. They might as well be holograms from Disneyland’s Haunted Mansion, just a hangover of years gone by. Or maybe Wall Street is stockbrokers, calling you at dinnertime, trying to put you into a few shares of some hot IPO. Or sleek bankers, guys (mostly) in gray Armani suits, blue shirts with white collars, and Hermès ties, jetting off to London to close some important deal. Not anymore.

Thanks to Dick Grasso, most of us think of Wall Street as balding men in ugly solid-colored suits yelling at each other and throwing litter on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange. Not even close.

So what is it? From 40,000 feet, Wall Street is about access to capital. The stock market trades every weekday, and sometimes slowly, sometimes violently, picks the economy’s winners and losers. Actually, it’s not the market, it’s you and me, our mutual funds and pension plans, the collective “we,” that do the picking via our buying and selling. It’s nice to be needed. You may not even realize it, but magically, the value of companies with great prospects goes up, meaning they can raise capital much more cheaply to hire smart programmers or build another solar panel factory. The flip side is that the price of companies doing all the wrong things (think General Motors and now Lehman Brothers) goes down, starving them of capital, a punishment for screwing up, until they disappear or do something to turn themselves around. The stock market, which is really you and me, does the dirty work of hiring and firing managers and green-lighting or killing projects. Pretty cool.

Radio, Radio: NPR and Rush

Doesn't get much different than these two radio outlets!

NPR Morning Edition September 16, 2008

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94658913

Investors Feel the Pain of Lehman Bros. Collapse by Chris Arnold

At 2:00 mark:

“This happens every cycle and I used to work on Wall Street and I competed against Drexel Burnham and Shearson and Dean Witter and EF Hutton and they’re gone. Each of them made one mistake or another along the way. This is nothing new. I don’t think we’ve entered a new era of the 1930’s and the Depression.”

 

“At the end of the day, no one really misses them. Because someone else steps up and takes over their business. And quite frankly, a lot of the people that work at these firms, the better of them get jobs across the street.”

NPR Morning Edition September 19, 2008

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94795760

Financial Sectors' New Buzzword Is Deleverage by Chris Arnold

At 2:05 mark:

“Wall Street was borrowing at 30 or 35 to 1 so all you needed was a slight little downtick in home prices, which were backing up these sub-prime loans, and you completely wipe firms out.”

Who Do You Trust? Conservatism.
September 25, 2008

http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_092508/content/01125108.guest.html

RUSH: Now, I went and grabbed a piece today in the Wall Street Journal, and it happens to end up being one of the most persuasive pieces I have read in all of this.  It's by Andy Kessler, a former hedge fund manager, and he's the author of How We Got Here, published in 2005.  Let me join his column in progress: [Quotes from column]

Now, I have some thoughts on this because this piece makes it clear this is not a bailout.  It's a rescue.  Now, these things still have some value.  I don't know what the value is, and they haven't been foreclosed on.  They're pretty close to worthless, but it's not technically a bailout.  And of course you're hearing all these warnings if we do this then there's not going to be any credit.  Okay, now, what does that mean?  ...  Okay, here we go. The piece I just read to you, Andy Kessler, I should give you the headline.  "The Paulson Plan Will Make Money for Taxpayers."  He's a former hedge fund manager, and that's how he analyzes this. He's one of these economists that has commuter models and he's run some projections.  Now, if this guy is right -- and who knows?  See, we don't know who to trust, and we don't know who's going to end up being right.  Our experienced is, "I'm from the government and I'm here to help you," means we're going to get screwed.  And we know there's not one single person involved in this I trust with that prediction. There's not a Ronald Reagan here.  If a Ronald Reagan was saying, "We gotta do this," I would believe it.  There isn't one of those.  So you've gotta scrounge around.  It's actually a great educational process.  
 
Snerdley came in today and said, "I have never worked harder in my life trying to understand this financial thing.  I've been spending more time this past week working on trying to understand this. 'Cause this is all Greek, all this lingo jingo they use, talking about these derivatives and the credit swaps," but it has been an amazing educational exercise.  But if this guy, Mr. Kessler, is right; it underscores points made prior to today by me on this program. Number one: that the federal government is nationalizing the financial markets.  I don't care what anybody says, this is nationalizing the financial markets.  Number two: these loans (he makes it clear in this piece) have not yet defaulted, even if they are risky.  Number three: when the market recovers, the federal government will be able to make lots of money selling the undefaulted loans back to the private sector. Even if they're sold below their original value, it will be more than the government paid to take them off the hands of the financial institutions today.
 
It's made clear by Mr. Kessler in his piece.  Also we can conclude since he's a former hedge fund manager and he likes this, that Wall Street's desperate for this to happen so that these financial institutions that are in need of cash can get it and get it fast, whatever price they have to sell their loans for.  Cash is king right now, they don't have any, and they need it.  They can't borrow. They can't lend. They can't do diddlysquat.  The federal government, as Mr. Kessler makes clear, will have a windfall of potentially trillions of dollars -- which, experience tells me, will be used to expand the size of government.  ...   Does it contain a lot of golden opportunities for people to take some of this stash and enrich themselves personally?  Now, these are the kind of rules there are going to have to built into this.  I'll tell you, as you go through this and you understand it, what becomes clear to me -- and I said at the beginning of this hour, "Who do you trust?"  I trust conservatism.  Conservatism and free market economies work.  It is based on growth.  ... The federal government, as Mr. Kessler, Andy Kessler of the Wall Street Journal today makes clear, the federal government will have a windfall of potentially trillions of dollars if his computer models are accurate -- which they will, I think, use to massively expand the federal government.  I have yet to see a massive pile of money show up that was unexpected that's either given back to us or used to reduce debt.  ...  We have far too many people who are becoming rich from government policy rather than the give-and-take of the free market.  So put simply, based on this article I read in the last hour from Andy Kessler in the Wall Street Journal, the federal government appears to be the only entity capable of coming up with the enormous amount of money it's going to take to take over these loans -- which have not failed yet but which the government itself requires these banks to devalue as assets.  Now, they are required to base their value on current prices.  This is what mark to market is. 

Read entire transcript here.

WSJ: Clean Up Print

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122230704116773989.html

In 1992, hedge-fund manager George Soros made $1 billion betting against the British pound. In 2007, John Paulson's Credit Opportunities fund correctly bet against subprime mortgages, clearing $15 billion for the year and $3.7 billion for him. Warren Buffett is now hoping to make big money on Goldman Sachs.

What pikers. These are small-time deals. My analysis suggests that Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (a former investment banker, no less, not a trader) may pull off the mother of all trades, which could net a trillion dollars and maybe as much as $2.2 trillion -- yes, with a "t" -- for the United States Treasury.

 

Here's what's happened so far. New technology like electronic trading meant that Wall Street's bread-and-butter business of investment banking and trading stocks stopped making much money years ago. So investment banks took their enormous capital and at first packaged yield-enhanced, subprime mortgage loans into complex derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Eventually and stupidly, these institutions owned them for themselves -- lots of them, often at 30-to-1 leverage. The financial products were made "safe" by insurance products known as credit default swaps, a credit derivative from companies such as AIG. When housing turned down, the mortgages and derivatives were worth a lot less and no one would lend Wall Street money anymore.

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (a former investment banker, no less, not a trader) may pull off the mother of all trades, which could net a trillion dollars

Then the piling on started. Hedge funds could short financial stocks and then bid down the prices of CDOs stuck on Wall Street's balance sheets. This was pretty easy to do in an illiquid market. Because of the Federal Accounting Standards Board's mark-to-market 157 rule, Wall Street had to write off the lower value of these securities and raise more capital, diluting shareholders. So the stock prices would drop, which is what the shorts wanted in the first place. It was all legit.

Forbes.com: Lehman = Pan Am

Not to sound harsh, but Lehman Brothers reminds me of Pan Am Airlines. No one (well, beyond their employees) is going to miss them. There are plenty of others to take their place.

In the '70s and '80s, a deregulated airline industry grew beyond its means, was stuck with bad assets, prices dropped and consolidation became inevitable. Pan Am was an early innovator, flying seaplanes into previously unreachable Caribbean Islands. They eventually flew everywhere, competed with everyone, stretched their balance sheet so it was as inedible as the mystery meat they served on flights and then one day went ... Poof!

The true money-makers on Wall Street all find jobs elsewhere. The worker bees in the middle tier see disruption, but are eventually absorbed. The bottom tier goes to work at Foot Locker

Analogies only go so far, but Wall Street got caught in the same wringer. Deregulated since 1975, balance sheets grew and grew as money got thrown at the profitable business of trading stocks and bonds, investment banking and money management. In the cheap-money period of 2002 to 2007, Wall Street’s thirst for capital saw no limits.

Inevitably, too many players and a bit of technology in the form of electronic trading squeezed the profitability of Wall Streets bread-and-butter businesses.

Forbes.com: Google's Offensive Strategy

Back in 1983 on the hit TV show The A-Team, George Peppard's Hannibal said to Mr. T's Bad Attitude Baracus, "There's an old saying: 'The best defense is a good offense.'"

Mr. T replied,"You got that wrong, man. A good offense is the best defense."

Then they wrestled pythons or something.

Make no mistake: This is not about browsers

On Tuesday, Google  let word slip--while showing off a comic book, of all things--about its new browser technology, code-named Chrome.

Was it offense against Microsoft's  Internet Explorer? Defense against Apple's  iPhone browser, Safari? A fight for the great network operating system in the sky? All of the above?

Tech Ticker: Is It Safe?

ABX Indicator

Click on ABX-HE-AAA 06-2 for the chart.

WSJ: The War for the Web

Microsoft was smart to walk away (for now) from its $44 billion bid for Yahoo. It's never good to overpay. But the software giant – whose stock has flatlined for eight years – was onto the right strategy in looking to the Web for growth.

Can't Microsoft build something on its own? Why the rush to pay billions for Yahoo? The simple (and wrong) answer was that adding Yahoo's 20% Web search market share to Microsoft's 10% meant that it could compete against Google's 60% share. Technology changes too fast for that to make sense except on paper. Programs run anywhere these days – on your desktop computer, on servers in data centers, on your iPod, cellphone, GPS, video game console, digital camera and on and on. It's not just about beating Google at search, it's about tying all these devices together in a new end-to-end computing framework.

With the Microsoft/Yahoo deal breakdown, everyone assumes Google walks away with the prize. Not so fast. This contest is just starting. For Microsoft or Google or anyone else to win, they need four key elements of an end-to-end strategy:

- The Cloud. The desktop computer isn't going away. But as bandwidth speeds increase, more and more computing can be done in the network of computers sitting in data centers – aka the "cloud."

There, search results can be calculated, companies' payrolls processed, even the complex graphics for video games can be drawn. But it's not cheap. These clouds are multibillion-dollar investments. Google spent $842 million in the last three months on servers, data centers and fiber optics.

Not only hasn't the Internet yet matured, it's becoming an ever-more high stakes game

Today, there are several major clouds: Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Amazon and smaller players IBM and Sun. Can there be more? Sure, but it would require a business model that could not only pay for it, but could rip it out every few years and modernize it. Google's $20 billion Web advertising business gives it the cash flow to do so. Advantage Google.

Tech Ticker: The Woz

Part 1 - Get Ready for the Woz!

Part 2 - Creating the Computer of My Dreams

Part 3 - Today's Young Innovators

Part 4 - Favorite Gadgets (yes, he packs a laser)

Part 5 - Stock jock/news junkie

Part 6 - Segway Jousting

NYT: QOTD

Huh?

Tech Ticker: Working Hard and Playing Hard

Carbon Fiber Lifestyle...